Zero Trust Network Architecture

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First Added:October 1, 2024 Updated: June 12, 2026

Zero Trust Network Architecture (zero trust) assumes no implicit trust based on network location. Every access request is authenticated, authorized, and encrypted using identity, device posture, and policy. We adopt these principles as the default security posture. Implement access with ZTNA, Access on Demand, and strong Single Sign-on, not perimeter VPNs alone.

Blurb

Zero trust security is an information-security model which maintains strict access controls and does not trust anything by default, inside or outside an organization’s perimeter.

Summary

Core idea: without a trusted “inside” network, you must enforce safety on every request. Perimeter firewalls and VPNs that grant broad LAN access do not meet that bar.

Common pillars (NIST-style):

PillarPractice
Verify explicitlyAuthN/AuthZ on every request; device and user posture
Least privilegeJust enough access for the task; time-bound where possible
Assume breachSegment, log, and monitor; no silent lateral movement

How we apply it: treat ZTNA as the default remote-access pattern. Pair Access on Demand for production and break-glass paths. Use Tailscale or similar L3 VPN only when an app truly needs network adjacency, not as the org-wide front door.

Not the same as: ZTNA (product and broker pattern) or a single vendor SKU. This note is the reference architecture under Specification.

Details

  • Origin: popularized in industry by Google’s BeyondCorp papers (see Garden Notes). NIST SP 800-207 documents a widely cited zero-trust architecture model.
  • Identity: Single Sign-on (OIDC/SAML) is the front door; group and role claims feed Policy as Code and access brokers.
  • Products (examples): Boundary (Hashicorp) for session-brokered infra access; commercial ZTNA suites when you need a managed broker fleet.
  • Contrast: “castle and moat” VPNs, flat VPC peering, and long-lived SSH keys on bastions are hold patterns for new work.